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THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
By 
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN* 
Electric industry restructuring has been an activity not free from 
difficulties. The California energy crisis of the summer of 2000, the 
world crisis after September 11, as well as the implosion of Enron have 
raised questions about the future of electricity restructuring. As a 
policy matter, the move to reduce command-and-control regulation of 
the electric industry and to promote competition enjoys widespread 
support. The industry, however, is not one that can be totally 
deregulated. This Article argues that the California and Enron crises 
may slow restructuring, but restructuring should continue as a matter 
of sound industrial policy. In addition, the crisis of September 11, while 
raising questions about the future of our energy policy, shouid have no 
bearing on the continuation of restructuring. The central problem with 
restructuring is the fact that transmission networks continue to have 
natural monopoly characteristics. Consequently, as transmission 
networks continue to be privately owned and controlled, problems of 
transmission price discrimination, fairness, and reasonableness must 
be addressed before restructuring can succeed. 
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By 2006-2011, electricity will be purchased and sold in both wholesale and 
eligible retail markets by any willing creditworthy participant. Markets will 
clear with competitive prices. Competitive prices will function so as to ration 
existing supplies efficiently in the short run and to elicit adequate technology 
and infrastructure in the long run, so that there will be no involuntary 
. curtailment of service at market prices. Electricity markets will be both 
transparent and liquid, and market participants will have opportunities to hedge 
risks. Although regulation of monopoly service providers will continue, even 
these monopolies will feel some pressure of competitive market forces. l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) staff to 
achieve competitive electricity markets by 2011 is overly ambitious, but 
nonetheless worthy. There is much to note in the quotation. First, both 
wholesale and eligible retail markets will be competitive, transparent, and 
liquid. Second, the markets will be so efficient that consumers will not 
experience involuntary curtailments. Third, market actors will be able to 
hedge risks, which is necessary for supply reliability. Finally, regulation of 
monopoly service will continue. This Article concentrates on the continuing 
regulation of the electricity industry by looking at the past and speculating 
about the future. Like Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which held that an 
observer cannot know both the speed and position of an electron, the , 
present state of electricity regulation is too dynamic to pin down. 
The last eighteen months have been remarkable for the electricity 
industry. The California crisis of the summer of 2000, the war against 
Afghanistan, and most recently, the Enron debacle, called attention to 
industry restructuring and the future of national energy policy. While each of 
these events have been catastrophic for California, Enron, and the world (in 
the case of Afghanistan), none of them. should change the direction of 
electric energy policy. At bottom, the California crisis was about poor 
1 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, CONCEPT DISCUSSION PAPER FOR AN ELECTRIC 
INDUSTRY TRANSMISSION AND MARKET RULE 1 (Dec. 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/calendar/commissionrneetingsldiscussion...papers.htm. 
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economic predictions and poor regulatory design. The Enron debacle was 
about poor financial hedge management along the lines of the Long Term 
Capital Management collapse in 1998.2 And the Bush administration's energy 
policy was set in place before September 11, 2001 and the following Afghan 
war. In short, none of these events should affect restructuring because none 
of them addresses what is most Significant, the ability to construct and 
maintain an efficient reliable transmission system. 
Continued regulation is warranted because the transmission segment of 
the electric industry maintains natural monopoly characteristics. Further, 
until there are significant technological advances, for example in distributed 
generation or fuel cells, regulation is justified. The discussion of electricity 
transmission will be placed in context by briefly discussing the California 
crisis and Enron in Part II. Part III examines the remaining aspects of natural 
monopoly in the electricity industry. Part IV discusses the role of electricity 
in national energy policy. The Article concludes by identifying five 
challenges facing the industry and its regulators. 
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING 
The language we use in policy analysis is almost as important as the 
language we use in legal analysis. The popular perception is that the Reagan 
Revolution was the beginning of deregulation during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. That perception is inaccurate. The Carter administration 
engaged in the deregulation of airlines, trucking, energy, and other 
industries.3 Still, the Reagan years stressed the importance of deregulation 
across a broad range of industries including electricity. Deregulation was 
and is driven by politics and economics. Economically, the country's 
infrastructure of roads, pipes, and wires has been built, thus the traditional 
regulatory scheme has accomplished its goals. Politically, markets and 
competition were and continue to be attractive on both sides of the 
congressional aisle. Consequently, deregulation continues. 
The electric industry was not immune from the deregulatory bug. 
However, the electric industry-and here is where language is important-
never caught the worst strain of the bug. While policymakers sought to 
"deregulate" the industry, the laws and regulations they used were intended 
and designed to "restructure," not deregulate, electricity. 
To understand why the industry is restructuring rather than 
deregulating, it is necessary to recognize fundamental principles about the 
electricity market, such as: 
• Electricity cannot be stored effectively-think batteries. 
• Electricity must be ready for use on demand-think cold beer and the 
Web. 
• Traditional regulation passed through costs to consumers-think 
inelasticity. 
2 Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110. 
3 See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAw AND POUCY 319-55 (2d 
ed.1998). 
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• Traditional regulation encouraged capital expansion-think nuclear 
power plants. 
• Traditional utilities were immune from competition in their monopoly 
protected service areas-think local public utility. 
• Traditional utilities controlled the wires that delivered the electrons-
think telephone pole. 
• New entrants were waiting in the wings-think Enron. 
All of these elements combined during the twentieth century to 
construct an expensive electricity infrastructure.4 Because electricity cannot 
be stored effectively and because it must be available on demand, the 
electricity system or grid must operate very reliably. Blackouts are not good. 
So the traditional rate formula, sometimes known as the regulatory compact, 
helped assure the construction of that infrastructure by rewarding capital 
investmenf This reward system was both good and bad. The infrastructure 
was built-that was good. However, because these costs were passed 
through to customers, utilities were rewarded for building, had a virtually 
guaranteed rate of return, and were immune from competition. As a result, 
utilities overbuilt. 5 f 
Once utility-generated electricity became too expensive, new entrants 
were ready to produce electricity at lower cost than the incumbent utilities. 
However, two significant problems arose. First, traditional public utilities 
controlled access and, naturally, were not favorably disposed to charge 
competitors friendly prices to transport electricity. Second, while consumers 
were anxious to purchase lower priced electricity, they also were concerned 
about the reliability of supply. With the stimulus of Congress, most notably 
through the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),6 the 
electricity industry began easing transmission access to nonutility electricity 
producers and, thus, the window to competition opened. 
It is at this point in the developing history of the electricity industry and 
its regulation that two new words enter our vocabulary-California and 
Enron. For the last year and a half, the California electricity crisis and the 
Enron debacle appear to demonstrate the failure of electricity restructuring. 
That appearance is false even though the restructuring movement has been 
slowed. As of January 2002, seven states have delayed restructuring 
activities, California has suspended action, and twenty five states are listed 
as not active.7 Both the California restructuring effort and Enron's energy 
4 See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government Regulation, 
33 TuLSA L.J. 827, 827 (1998); ENERGY LAw GROUP, ENERGY LAw AND POUCY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 12-1 to 12-39 (2000) (describing and analyzing the history of the energy market in the 
United States). 
5 The classic article about this phenomenon is Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, 
Behavior of the Firm Under RegulatOly Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
6 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.s.C. 
The key provisions are at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2000)); see Thomas E. Mack, PURPA and the 
Regulation of Alternative Energy Sources, in 5 ENERGY LAw & TRANSACTIONS ch. 130 (David J. 
Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 1991). 
7 Dep't of Energy, Status of State Electricity Restmcturing Activity, at 
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tradiI).g modus operandi were the products of design failure, not faulty 
theoretical assumptions. Indeed, although both were failed attempts, 
California's electricity restructuring and Enron's energy trading point to the 
future of a restructured electric industry. 
A. California 
There is no shortage of analyses of the California electricity crisis.s 
Fundamentally, the crisis was a matter of supply and demand, resulting in 
prices beyond any previously recognized level and a bankruptcy filing by 
Pacific Gas & Electric, one of California's Big Three utilities. The market 
distortions were created by poor predictions about demand, a hot summer, a 
dry Northwest, high natural gas prices, miscalculations about supply, no new 
generation, and most significantly, a poor regulatory design. 
Although the crisis has passed, and prices have lowered and blackouts, 
rolling or otherwise, are not on the horizon, there are lessons to be learned 
from the California experience.9 Chief among these lessons involves 
regulatory design, the crux of which was an inflexible market for buying, 
selling, and pricing electricity. There are three notable aspects to this design, 
. one of which was fatal. First, the major public utilities in California divested 
their generating units while maintaining an obligation to serve their 
customers. As long as costs are passed through to consumers, the obligation 
to serve does not present a severe problem because the utilities earn money 
to pay their bills. Second, two new regulatory entities were established, the 
California Power Exchange (PX), which set prices, and the California 
Independent System Operator (ISO), which directed the movement of 
electricity through the system. The PX was the market mechanism intended 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ch!L,str/regmap.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002). 
S See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets (and Some SolutioIlS), 
PROGRAM ON WORKABLE ENERGY WORKING PAPER SERIES, PWP-OS1 (Jan. 2001) (arguing that 
California's electricity supply problems in 2000 are an example of how deregulated wholesale 
electricity markets do not function properly as currently implemented), available at 
http://www.uceLberkeley.eduluceilPDF/pwpOSl.pdf; Symposium, The California Crisis, 24 
REGULATION 57 (Fall 2001); AM. BAR AsS'N, SECTION OF PuBLIC UTILITY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 
TRANSPORTATION LAw, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 15-19 (2001); AM. BAR AsS'N, SECTION OF ENV'T, 
ENERGY, AND RES. & NAT'L ENERGY-ENVTL L. & POL'y INST., ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND 
RESOURCES LAw: 2000 - THE YEAR IN REVIEW 1-13 (2001) (calling the year 2000 a deregulation 
meltdown); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, WESTERN MARKETS AND THE CAUSES OF THE 
SUMMER 2000 PRICE ABNORMALITIES (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://cipsJerc.fed.us/electriclel/eIOO-
95.00h.txt; Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity Crisis: How Best to Respond to the 
"Perfect Stonn", 22 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2001) (citing weather, gas prices, and economics as causes 
of the California electricity crisis); Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindth, Lessons from the 
California "Apocalypse": Jurisdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2001); ERIC HIRST, 
THE CAUFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS FOR OTHER .STATES (2001), at 
http://www.eei.org/issues/compJeg/Caiessons_hirst.pdf; Richard Green, Failing Electricity 
Markets: Should We Shoot the Pools?, CENTER FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, DISCUSSION PAPER 
2406 (2001) (electricity markets in California, England, and Wales). 
9 Laura M. Holson, Government Acts to Calm California's Energy Market, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 
16, 2000, at A14; Neela Banerjee, A Dwindling Faith in Deregulation, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 15, 2000, 
at C1; Gregory Palast, States Deregulate Energy at their Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A25. 
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to make the industry competitive.lO The PX and the ISO are perfectly 
appropriate entities, again if properly designed. 
The fatal flaw was the price restrictions. They were the medicine 
intended to help the consumers, but that killed the restructuring. Utilities 
had to buy wholesale energy at market price from the PX in no more than 
day-ahead or hour-ahead markets, which meant they could not enter long-
term contracts. These spot-market purchases were subject to a great deal of 
volatility and the highest bid set the price. At the same time, retail prices to 
consumers were capped until the utility recovered its stranded costS.11 The 
problem was that the utilities bought in the spot-market at extraordinarily 
high prices and sold in a capped retail market, thus putting themselves in a 
credit crunch with high profits for other producers, high prices to some 
consumers,12 and a political crisis for the Governor. 
The market distortion was aggravated by the fact that the retail cap sent 
consumers the wrong price signals. They had little incentive to conserve 
and, to aggravate matters, California stopped bringing power plants on line. 13 
Indeed, demand had risen twenty-five percent in the past eight years while 
in-state power generation rose only six percent. 14 
There are several culprits to blame for the California energy crisis of 
2000. Governor Gray Davis blames the owners of power production as "out-
of-state profiteers" for allegedly withholding power from California 
companies in an attempt to drive up prices. 15 Consumer groups blame the 
same energy companies as well as California politicians willing to bailout 
the California power retailers, such as SoCal Edison, Pacific Gas and 
Electric (PG&E), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E).16 The out-of-
state owners of energy production, Dynegy, Duke Energy, and Enron 
criticized the California politicians and bureaucrats that crafted a system 
that allowed them to capitalize on the circumstances that led to the 
10 Becky Kilbourne & George Sladoje, The Role of Power Exchanges in Restructured 
Electric Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 1, 1999, at 28,31. 
11 Stranded costs are "[closts incurred by a utility which may not be recoverable under 
market-based retail competition. Exanlples include undepreciated generating facilities, deferred 
costs, and long-term contract costs.» Energy Info. Admin., EIA Energy Definitions Glossary, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_st.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). The assumption 
was that competitive electricity prices would drop below the cap so that stranded costs could 
be recovered. 
12 Once San Diego Gas & Electric recovered its stranded costs, it was able to remove the 
price cap causing the typical household electricity bill to rise from $55 to $105. William P. 
Kucewicz, Too Much Regulation Keeps California in the Dark, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,2000, at A14; 
James Sterngold, In Reverse, California Acts to Cap Some Electric Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2000, at A14. 
13 Peter Coy & Christopher Palmeri, Gridlock on the Power Grid, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 2000, at 
48. . 
14 Kucewicz, supra note 12, at A14. 
15 Nancy Vogel & Chris Kraul, U.S. Threat to Out-oi-State Power Firms Arests Blackouts, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,2000; at AI. 
16 Anthony York, The Deregulation Debacle, at 
http://www.salon.com/newslfeature/2001l01l30/deregulation-miss/index.html (last visited Mar. 
2,2002). 
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problems in California. 17 
By December 2000, the crisis had not eased. Early that month, the ISO 
declared Stage 2 power alerts. At this point, federal intervention was needed. 
The ISO needed FERC to lift the limit on wholesale energy rates,18 and 
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson ordered out-of-state suppliers to send their 
electricity to California under threat of federal intervention by way of price 
setting. 19 Additionally, the utilities' credit was threatened. Chase Manhattan 
Bank led a consortium to oppose a $5 billion credit line extended to SoCal 
Edison based on fears that the loan would not be repaid,20 and Standard and 
Poor's lowered So Cal Edison's and PG&E's credit ratings.21 
Events were so problematic that drastic steps, including state 
ownership, were openly discussed. Governor Davis and others called for a 
regional price cap,22 long-term contracts for purchasing power, the creation 
of a state power authority that would issue bonds to help the utilities to pay 
their bills, and to take over the transmission system owned by the Big Three 
utilities.23 The leading consumer group in California, the Foundation for 
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, proposed to end deregulation immediately, 
fearing that long-term contracts would lead to higher prices.24 Consumers 
were opposed to a bailout of privately owned utilities with no chance of 
recovering the money through other means.25 
Governor Davis asked the California Legislature for more authority to 
fmance power plant construction, take over ownership, borrow money for 
investigators to determine whether power plants that are shutting down for 
"unscheduled maintenance" actually need to be fIxed,26 and repeal the law 
requiring the Big Three utilities to sell their remaining plants, thus keeping 
out-of-state generators from buying the plants.27 
By January, bankruptcy threatened as utilities had diffIculty meeting 
their bills to purchase power8 and out-of-state suppliers had become 
hesitant to supply power because bills were not being paid. On January 17, 
17 Anthony York, Energy Vultures, at 
http://www.salon.comltechlfeature/2001l02l14!generators (last visited Mar. 2, 2002). 
18 Christian Berthelsen, Power Stays On, But State's Darkest Days May Lie Ahead, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 9, 2000, at AI. 
19 Vogel & Kraul, supra note 15, at AI. 
20 Rebecca Smith, State's Electricity Is in Chaos, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2{)00, at A2. 
21 Id. . 
22 Associated Press, California Scrambles for Power-Again-And Seeks More Federal 
Help, CNN WEBSITE, Dec. 14, 2000, at 
http://www.cnn.coml2000IUS/12114!west.coast.power.ap/index.html. 
23 Ed Mendel & Dean Calbreath, State Considers Takeover Option, SAN DIEGO UNION-'TRIB., 
Jan. 6, 2001, at AI. 
24 Harvey Rosenfield & Douglas Heller, Averting Disaster with State Utilities, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-'TRIB., Dec. 19,2000, at Bll. 
25 Jonathan Curiel & David Lazarus, Consumer Groups, Utilities Butt Heads on Electric 
Rates, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2000, atAl. 
26 Nancy Vogel, Davis' Tough Talk Faces Even Tougher Obstacles, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001, 
atAl. 
27 David Lazarus, Davis Offers Energy Plan, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2001, at AI. 
28 Associated Press, Houston Power Supplier Threatens to Bankrupt California Utilities, 
CNN WEBSITE, Jan. 16,2001, atwww.cnn.coml2001IUS/01l16/power.woes.ap/index.html. 
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Califorrua imposed statewide rolling blackouts for the first time.29 The next 
day, Governor Davis declared a State of Emergency over the power crisis 
and asked the legislature to authorize emergency funqs to keep electricity on 
for the next seven to ten days. The utilities agreed not to go into court if the 
Legislature passed a bill allowing the utilities to enter into long-term 
contracts with suppliers, which would then be resold to consumers at a cost 
set by the state plus a modest charge.3o On January 18, the legislature 
approved spending hundreds of millions of dollars to keep power flowing in 
California, and Governor Davis signed legislation making the Department of 
Water Resources the main buyer ofpower.31 
By the middle of February, Governor Davis announced that the state 
would buy the transmission system from the three utilities, the utilities' 
parent companies would provide them with cash to payoff their debts, the 
utilities would keep the power they produce at their own plants for ten 
years, and the utilities would drop all lawsuits against the state.32 The 
winners in deregulation were out-of-state owners of generating plants who 
were able to take advantage of a poorly crafted law for their own benefit. 
Although the failure of California's deregulation effort frightened many 
other states considering similar ideas,33 other states have enjoyed success. 
Pennsylvania, for example, has been more successful in its efforts to 
deregulate the electric industry. Utilities are allowed to keep their generating 
plants, and the phasing in of market prices is over a ten-year period. Utilities 
that could buy power for less would make a profit; those that could not 
make a profit would have to absorb the 10ss.34 Any utilities that sold their 
generating plants were forced to enter long-term contracts with suppliers. 
B. Enron 
Enron's role as power marketer and energy trader is exactly what a 
deregulated electricity market needs. Unfortunately, its bankruptcy and 
ensuing civil and criminal investigations prevent Enron from fulfilling that 
role. Because demand requires instantaneous supply (Le., reliability), there 
must be some mechanism to assure that supply. In the traditional regulated 
environment, the local utility maintained adequate reserves to satisfy 
demand. In unregulated or deregulated markets, consumers protect 
themselves either with contracts for futures or with backup power. Enron 
bought and sold futures contracts and helped make a market in electricity, 
29 Nancy Vogel & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Rolling Blackouts Push Energy Crisis from Threat 
to Reality, L.A. TIMES, Jan. IS, 2001, at AI. 
30 Greg Lefevre, California Governor Declares State of Emergency in Electricity Crisis, CNN 
WEBSITE, Jan. IS, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001IVS/01l1S/power.woesOllindex.html. 
31 Miguel Bustillo, et al., Lawmakers Vote to Use Reserve Fund as Bush Rejects Power Price 
Caps, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,2001, at AI. 
32 Ed Mendel, Davis Outlines Plan to Rescue Ailing Utilities, SAN DIEGO UNION-THIS., Feb. 
17,2001, at AI. 
33 John Greenwald, The New Energy Crunch, TIME.COM, Jan. 22, 2001, at 
http://www.time.com/t. .. zine/printoutlO,SS16,96190,00.html. 
34 Peter Schrag, Blackout, AM. PROSPECT., Feb. 26, 2001, at 29,30-31. 
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among other commodities. Enron was the industry leader in taking 
advantage of deregulation and restructuring. It was estimated that Enron 
controlled about one-quarter of the country's energy trading. 35 
Enron was a small traditional natural gas pipeline firm that went on to 
become a huge company with market capitalization of about $60 to $70 
billion. It also transformed its business from a stodgy enterprise to a high-
flying trader that traded in electricity futures, bandwidth, advertising space, 
and even weather features. 36 In the end, Enron became less an energy 
company than a hedge fund. It had a difficult enough time explaining its 
business even to its CEO, ultimately collapsing into bankruptcy.37 
Nevertheless, energy futures can be an effective way to provide reliable 
sources of electricity, supplement reserve margins held by traditional 
utilities, and control price uncertainty. Futures, then, can work with either 
power exchanges or ISOs to stabilize electricity markets. 
The collapse, however, has little to say about energy markets in general 
or even hedge funds in particular.38 Nor should its collapse have anything to 
do with a change in direction for energy deregulation.39 While Congress, the 
Justice Department, and the Securities Exchange Commission continue to 
investigate Enron, the deregulation of the energy industry continues4o as 
Enron sells off assets and settles lawsuits and other companies take up 
futures trading where Enron left off. 
III. ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION AND NATURAL MONOPOLY 
The electricity industry provides an excellent case study of government 
regulation. Like other network industries such as natural gas, telephone, and 
railroad, the regulation of electricity was based on the central political 
economic idea that the industry had natural monopoly characteristics and 
that electricity served the public interest.41 As a fundamental matter of 
political economy, markets and the property exchanged and valued in them 
exist only because of government protection. Still, it is the degree of 
protection that distinguishes government treatment of some industries from 
the treatment of others. It is also the case that the degree of government 
intervention changes over time. 
35 Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: Audaciolls Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying 
Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2002, at AI. 
36 Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58. 
37 Id. 
38 Nelson D. Schwartz, Enron Fallout: Wide, But Not Deep, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 71. 
39 Vijay Vaitheeswaran, ElectriCity Deregulation is Still Sound Policy, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 15, 
2001, at A31; Joseph Kahn & Jeff Gerth, Collapse May Reshape the Battlefield of Deregulation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C1; Oman W. Jenkins, Jr., Enron = Deregulation?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
19, 2001, at A19; Mark Mills & Peter Huber, Deregulation Will Survive Enron, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 
2001, at A20. 
40 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bumiller, Enron Contacted 2 Cabinet Officials Before Collapsing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11,2002, at AI; Don Van Natta, Jr., Circling the Wagons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at 
AI. 
41 Joseph P. Tomain, Toward a Sustainable Energy-Environmental Policy, in ENERGY LAw 
GROUP, supra note 4, at 6-1,6-5 to 6-35. 
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In its beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, electricity was an 
unregulated competitive industry. The industry, for the most part, consisted 
of investor owned utilities (IOUs) that owned and operated generation, 
transmission, and distribution. Later, as the industry consolidated, 
government regulation was justified as a way to stem the abuses of market 
power exercised by these vertically integrated utilities.42 The particular 
market imperfection in the electric industry was natural monopoly and 
government responded with command-and-control regulations setting the 
prices that could be charged by utilities and limiting the profits that utilities 
could earn.43 Price and profit controls are a form of heavy-handed ec.onomic 
regulation that comes with costs of its own. Starting in the mid-1960s, 
traditional utility regulation appeared to have run its course as market 
distortions arose and as policymakers began to look at regulatory reform 
and deregulation.44 While it is true that the heavy hand of command-and-
control price regulation is being lifted and market-based price mechanisms 
are preferred, government still has a large and continuing regulatory role to 
play. 
A. Theories of Regulation 
Theories of, or justifications for, government regulation can be 
characterized in two basic ways. The first characterization is called the 
public interest theory, in which natural monopoly, or other market 
imperfection, is controlled for the delivery of a reliable service or good in 
the public interest. The second characterization of government regulation is 
private interest group or public choice theory, which holds that government 
regulates at the behest of, and for the benefit of, the regulated industry 
rather than for the public. In the case of electricity, public choice theory 
holds that government regulation enabled industry expansion and growth for 
the direct economic benefit of privately owned utilities. 
Neither theory alone explains the government regulation of network 
industries. Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples and counter-examples 
of both concepts. One example of public interest regulation is the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA),45 which was intended to control 
stock manipulation and other forms of consumer and shareholder fraud. A 
counter example of public interest legislation is the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996,46 which was enacted purportedly in the public interest, but in reality 
is a classic set of private industry interest group deals. A good example of 
regulation for the benefit of a private interest group is trucking regulation; a 
42 Jeffrey W. Meyers & Robert M. Lamkin, Electricity, in 2 ENERGY LAw AND TRANSACTIONS 
§ 52.01-.04 (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2001). 
43 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In Munn, the Illinois state legislature set grain 
elevator prices. The United States Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis that the 
regulation of "virtual" or natural monopolies of goods, affecting the public interest, was 
constitutional. [d. 
44 Tomain, supra note 4 at, 834-35. 
45 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000). 
46 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-276 (2000). 
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counter-example of interest group regulation is airline deregulation. And the 
list goes on. 
Regulation thus is comprised of mixed political and economic 
motives.47 Traditional utility rate regulation, for example, can be seen as 
consumer protection against monopoly power because prices . are set at 
competitive rather than supracompetitive levels. Rate regulation can also be 
seen as a reward to the regulated privately owned utility through nearly 
guaranteed rates of return for its capital investment. Traditional utility 
regulation also establishes guaranteed service areas that benefit utilities by 
protecting them from competition and benefit consumers by providing 
universal service. 
The transition48 of the electric industry involves a lessening of 
command-and-control price and profit regulation, deregulation of electricity 
generation, a promotion of consumer choice, an increase in competition, and 
active discussion of retail price competition. The barrier to retail price 
competition is the fact that the transmission system is privately owned and 
operated. Over the last two decades, transmission has been opening to 
competition, but only partially, because the system retains its natural 
monopoly characteristics. Although the regulatory state has abandoned the 
idea that the entire electricity industry is a natural monopoly, it retains the 
idea that the transmission segment requires continued regulation because of 
that natural monopoly. 
B. The Growth and Regulation of the Electricity Industry 
As noted, natural monopoly has been the justification for electricity 
regulation. A simple definition of natural monopoly is that product costs for 
som~ time "will be lower if they consist in a single supplier. "49 While more 
technical definitions exist, the central idea is that one firm can realize 
economies of scale throughout a range of production, thus continually 
lowering cost. 50 A supporting justification is the idea that any capital 
investment made by a competing firm is duplicative and therefore wasteful. 
A specific service area needs only one set of electric or telephone wires; the 
investment in any other set of wires is wasteful. Economically, the one-firm 
model makes sense because that single finn. can supply the market at the 
47 See generally Stephen P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1998); JERRY 1. MAsHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: 
USING PuBUC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBUC LAw (1997); George Priest, The Origins of Utility 
Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation Debate", 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993); Joseph P. 
Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377 (1997); 
CHARLES E. LINDBWM, POUTICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POUTICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM (1977) . 
. 48 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transfonnation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1383 (1998). 
49 ALFRED E. KAHN, 1 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITIITIONS 11 
(1991). 
50 See generally WILUAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1982); ROGER 
SHERMAN, THE REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 81 (1989); SANFORD v. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, 
NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1988); W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 79-81 (2d ed. 1995). 
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cheapest cost. However, what follows is that a single firm in a protected 
service area is a monopoly and, therefore, can exercise monopoly power, 
which means that the firm can increase price, decrease supply, and reduce 
consumer surplus all at once.51 Politically, it was socially desirable to 
distribute electricity as a public good. Thus, the economic definition of, and 
the public policy arguments for, natural monopoly coalesced into a political 
justification for the regulation of public utilities, including electricity. 52 
Natural monopoly theory puts policy makers in something of a bind. On 
the one hand, the utility's product is seen as desirable and is most cheaply 
delivered by one provider. On the other hand, a lone provider is a 
monopolist. Because state ownership was not likely, the regulatory solution, 
ironically, was a ,state controlled monopoly-the regulatory compact-as 
described in the following quotation from Judge Kenneth Starr: 
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a 
particular geographical area (coupled with state-conferred rights of eminent 
domain or condemnation) is granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of 
intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free 
market. . . . Each party to the compact gets something in the bargain. As a 
general rule, utility investors are provided a level of stability in earnings and 
value less likely to be attained in the unregulated or moderately regulated 
sector; in tum, ratepayers are afforded universal, non-discriminatory service 
and protection from monopolistic profits through political control over an 
economic enterprise. 53 
Monopoly regulation was able to preserve scale economies while 
avoiding competitors' economically wasteful investments for a period of 
time. The regulatory compact imposes significant obligations on both the 
government and on the regulated firm. In exchange for a government-
protected monopoly, the utility lets government set its prices through 
ratemaking. The utility is given the power of eminent domain to lower its 
transaction costs in constructing its network; is given an exclusive franchise 
or service area thus preventing competition; and is, therefore, the only firm 
51 SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAw AND POLICY 190 (2d ed. 1998). 
52 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ,PuBLIC UTILITY RATES CH. 2 (2D ED. 1988); 
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PuBLIC UTILITIES 72-73 (3d ed. 1993). 
53 Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The 
concept of the "regulatory compact" is best understood'as a shorthanded way of describing the 
relationship between the regulated utility and government regulators. Recently, this relationship 
has been described as a "regulatory contract." This description is unfortunate for two reasons. 
First, it is wrong as a matter of law. There are few, if any, examples of actual bargained-for 
contracts between governments and utilities.J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, 
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY GONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 109-10 (1997). Second, the label "regulatory 
contract" is a makeweight argument for a particular policy position favoring an expansive 
definition of stranded cost reimbursement for industry. See Jim Rossi, The Irony of 
DeregulatoIY Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998) (criticizing Sidak and Spulber's use of the 
"regulatory contract" as a construct to create a takings claim for stranded costs resulting from 
deregulation). 
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authorized to sell its product in that area under an obligation to serve. 54 The 
government, through ratemaking, sets the price of its service at rates that 
allow a prudently managed utility to cover its operating expenses and earn a 
reasonable return on its capital investment, thus yielding a profit. 55 The 
regulatory control of natural monopoly, then, occurs by 1) limiting entry, 2) 
setting prices, 3) controlling profits, and 4) imposing a service obligation. 
The traditional formula accomplished its public interest purpose by 
enabling the capital expansion of the industry and the construction of the 
country's utility infrastructure. The formula also kept rates reasonable for 
most of the last century. However, with the traditional formula, a utility had 
no economic incentive to reduce expenses and had an economic incentive to 
make capital investments because the more a firm invested, the more it 
earned for its shareholders. 56 
C. Clitique of Natural Monopoly 
The earliest reference to natural monopoly appears to be from 
England's Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale in his 1670 treatise De Portibus 
Maris, which justified the government regulation of seaports because they 
were affected with a public interest. 57 The concept was also applied to 
public utilities in 1848 by John Stuart Mill in The Principles of Political 
Economy.58 Since then, political economists continued to advance the idea. 59 
The general acceptance of the idea does not, of course, mean that natural 
monopoly theory is without critics.6o 
There are two basic critiques. The first is a critique of economic theory, 
and the most notable criticism comes from Harold Demsetz in his article, 
Why Regulate Utilities,61 in which he argued that even if only one firm 
survives, it need not set a monopoly price because even that market can be 
subject to competition through contracting.62 Demsetz's argument attacks 
economic theory: "[W]e have no theOIY that allows us to deduce from the 
observable degree of concentration in a particular market whether or not 
price and output are competitive."63 The second criticism of utility regulation 
54 Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the 
Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 27 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., CHARLES F. PHIlliPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBIJC UTIIJTIES: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 171-82 (3d ed. 1993). 
56 Averch & Johnson, supra note 5, at 4. 
57 See Munn v. lliinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126-29 (1876). 
58 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POIJTICAL ECONOMY 143-44 (1884). 
59 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An 
American Historical Perspective, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1263 (1984); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM (1992); Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly TheoI}', in 
UNNATURAL MONOPOIJES: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBIJC UTIIJTIES 1 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. 
ed., 1985). 
60 See, e.g., Richard 1. Gordon, Don't Restructure Electricity: Deregulate, 20 CATO J. 327 
(2001). 
61 Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). 
62 Id. at 58-59. 
63 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis in original). 
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is more pointedly political: industry loves regulation because it protects 
firms from competition.64 This is the so-called capture theory. 65 
Demsetz states that,· while a bidding model may result in only one 
producer, economic theory does not require even that provider to sell at a 
monopoly price because there are other competitors waiting in the wings. In 
effect, Demsetz is arguing that, while there may be no competition within an . 
identified market, such as electricity, there is competition for the market. He 
goes on to write: "There are only two important assumptions: (1) The inputs 
to enter production must be available to many potential bidders at prices 
determined in open markets .... (2) The cost of colluding by bidding rivals 
must be prohibitively high. "66 
Demsetz is both wrong and right. He is wrong as an empirically 
observable matter on both assumptions for a given historical period. For 
most of the first half of the twentieth century, the utility market was not 
competitive. Instead, as technologies developed and utilities felt the need for 
growth, they consolidated, exercised market power, and engaged in 
customer and shareholder abuses. Because utilities require large front-end 
capital investments, these investments form entry barriers and they do 
exercise market power.67 In other words, his first assumption about inputs 
did not come to pass in the formative decades of the industry. Also, because 
there are high entry costs, there is nothing to prevent the successful bidder 
from exercising monopoly power. Further, the transaction costs for buyers 
to organize and drive down prices is also high, thus preventing full 
competition. High entry costs, available economies of scale, and the 
presence of monopolies in service areas, prevented the development of a 
.competitive electric industry. Again, these facts pertain to a particular 
historical period until approximately 1965.68 
After that date, Demsetz's theory is partially correct. Over time, 
vertically integrated utilities under the traditional rate formula overbuilt, and 
generation became more costly. Rival producers could produce electricity 
more cheaply, and certain customers, particularly large industrial customers, 
brought pressure to bear on utilities to get access to cheaper electricity. In 
short, the generation end of the fuel cycle showed signs of competition. It 
did not, and does not, follow that the current transmission system operates 
other than as a monopoly bottleneck.69· 
64 RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTIIJTY SYSTEM 23-24 (1999). 
65 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 
3 (1971); Richard Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 336-39 
(1974); George Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" 
Debate, 36 J. OF LAw & ECON. 289, 290 (1993). 
66 Demsetz, supra note 61, at 58. 
67 John J. Fialka, Energy Secretary Says He Has Evidence Some Utilities Use Monopoly 
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2000, at A4; WERNER TROESKEN, WHY REGULATE UTIIJTIES? THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE CHICAGO GAS INDUSTRY 1849-1924, at 9-13 (1996). 
68 See, e.g., LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTIIJTIES: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FuTuRE 151-61 (7th ed. 2000). 
69 "Bottleneck" is used two ways in discussing the transmission system. The narrower 
meaning is that there are regions within the system that become increasingly constrained. 
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D. Precursors to Electric IndustIy Restructuring 
For most of the twentieth century, producers,· consumers, and 
regulators believed in the wisdom of the traditional regulation of the utility 
industry based on the natural monopoly assumptions. There were good 
reasons for that belief, as it was supported by the economy and by the 
effects on shareholders' and ratepayers' pocketbooks. 
The U.S. economy was expanding throughout most of the century with, 
of course, the exception of the Great Depression. The political-economic 
response to the Great Depression, in the form of the New Deal, was quite 
favorable to the electric industry.70 As part of the New Deal program to 
stabilize the economy, the government pushed forward a plan to stabilize the 
country's energy infrastructure, particularly in the electric71 and natural gas72 
industries. These legislative schemes proved particularly fruitful after the 
Second World War, as both the economy and energy production expanded at 
predictable rates.73 As a consequence of traditional rate regulation and a 
friendly economy, shareholders were happy because producers expanded 
plants at little or no financial risk, thus earning reliable returns and receiving 
reliable service. Ratepayers were happy because utilities were continuing to 
realize economies of scale and, therefore, rates were either relatively flat or 
declining. Regulators were happy because neither producers nor consumers 
were complaining, rate hearings were relatively uncomplicated, and public 
utility commissions were largely nonpolitical agencies.74 
Understandably, traditional utility regulation could not last forever. Just 
as there are natural business cycles for industry, so there are cycles of 
regulati()n.75 A business, for example, may start competitively then 
consolidate to reduce competition, resulting in competitive market failure. 
In such a case, government regulation can attempt to correct that failure 
until regulation experiences failure itself. 76 The regulation of the electric 
These regions themselves are also known as bottlenecks. See ROGER W. GALE & MARy 
Q'DRISCOLL, THE CASE FOR NEW ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION AND SITING NEW TRANSMSSION LiNES 8 
(2001), available at http://eei.org/issues/news/transmission-case.pdf. "Bottleneck" can also be 
applied to the system as a whole. Bottleneck is used here in its broader sense. 
70 JOHN GARRETSON CLARK, ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: FOSSIL FuEL POUCIES, 
1900-1946 (1987); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. 
Cow. L. REV., 355, 358-63 (1990). 
71 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-823. (2000). 
72 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.s.C. § 717 (2000). 
73 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 151-52. 
74 WIlliAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POUTICS OF PuBUC UTIUTY REGULATION 7,212 (1983). 
75 MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74 (1955); 
CLAUDIA GOLDIN AND GARY D. LiBECAP, THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO 
POUTICAL ECONOMY 2 (1994); SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, ch. 5. 
76 See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189 (1986) (examining in depth the legal and political history of federal regulation and 
providing extensive analysis and criticism of the results of these years of regulatory 
development); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 1836-1937 (1991) 
(exploring the rise of federal regulation and the changes in the relationship between the federal 
government and private enterprise that resulted); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF 
REGULATION (1984) (explaining the development of federal regulation through an examination 
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industry has gone through that cycle, from an unregulated competitive 
market, to market failure and attendant regulation, then to regulatory 
failure. 77 Now politicians, regulators, and other interested actors are 
responding to the regulatory failure in the electric industry for political and 
economic reasons. 
1. Economic and Political Justifications 
Starting roughly in 1965, the industry reached technological and 
[mancial plateaus at which industry expansion slowed considerably; 
economies of scale were not being realized, costs were increasing, 
generation was overbuilt, and alternative providers were coming into the 
market. Economic indicators were such that utilities could no longer rely on 
the armual seven percent growth rate they had enjoyed since the end of 
World War II. The traditional rate formula which encouraged capital 
expansion put utilities in the position of continuing to dump money into the 
rate base, thus increasing costs. Inflation and other economic indicators 
caused marginal costs to exceed average costs as utilities ran into trouble 
with cost overruns, plant cancellations, and the like. In short, competition 
was peeking from behind regulatory blankets. 78 
Politically, things also changed dramatically in the mid-1960s. 
Production costs began to increase and rates began to rise for a number of 
reasons. General economic inflation, increased concern about the 
environment and an attendant increase in regulatory costs, Vietnam War 
expenditures, an unstable world economy, the 1965 Northeast blackout, and 
the failure of nuclear power all contributed to unsettling the electric industry 
and its customers.79 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) added to this state of affairs by flexing its cartel muscles and closing 
the oil spigot, which pushed inflation to double digits, and increased energy 
prices generally. Also, the price elasticity of demand for electricity was more 
elastic than anticipated, and consumers both reduced their electricity 
consumption and sought energy from alternative sources, further reducing 
their dependence on traditional utilities. Large consumers, for example, 
became self-generators, and small consumers installed solar panels. The 
reduction in consumption also caused rates to increase for remaining 
customers. All of these events made the formerly staid public utility 
commissions politically charged agencies, as critics attacked the basis of 
traditional rate regulation from both sides. Producers wanted rates to be 
more market sensitive and ratepayers wanted to avoid rate shock. 
of four major early proponents of regulation in the United States); ARTHUR M. ScHLESINGER, JR., 
THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 219-255 (1986). 
77 Tomain, supra note 4, at 829. 
78 Id. at 833-43; see also HYMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 164-65. 
79 See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 82-86 (1987) (discussing 
changes in nuclear power regulation). 
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2. PURPA's Surprise: Illcreased CompetitionBo 
The combined effects of the political and economic events in the late 
1960s and early 1970s raised public concern about the country's energy 
future and raised particular concern in the Carter White House, which 
viewed the Energy Crisis as the "moral equivalent of war."81 Jimmy Carter 
addressed the Energy Crisis through two major legislative initiatives. The 
first was the massive and ambitious National Energy Act,82 which addressed 
conventional fuels. The National Energy Act had several purposes, including 
moving the country away from dependence on foreign oil, promoting the use 
of coal, increasing energy efficiency, modernizing utility ratemaking, 
stimulating conservation, encouraging the creation of a new market in 
electricity, and restructuring a distorted market in natural gas. Carter's 
second initiative, the Energy Security Act of 1980,83 addressed conservation 
and alternative fuels from biomass, wind and solar to tar sands and oil shale. 
The surprising part of the National Energy Act was the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),84 which was aimed at securing reasonably 
priced energy for the nation through conservation, increasing use of 
alternative sources, and moving toward market-based rates. 
PURPA encouraged states to move away from declining block 
ratemaking because it promoted consumption, and to move toward marginal 
cost pricing because it was more efficient; it also encouraged independent 
power production through cogeneration and small power generation as 
energy source alternatives to large public utilities. What surprised everyone 
was how much new nonutility generated electricity was available and how 
80 See ENERGY LAw GROUP, supra note 4, at 12-20 to 12-21. 
81 President's Address to the Nation, PuB. PAPERS 656 (Apr. 18, 1977). 
82 The National Energy Act consists of five pieces of major legislation: the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 29 Stat. 3206 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12, 15, 26, 31, and 42 U.S. C.); the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 42, and 45 
U.S.C.); the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, PUb. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 & 42 U.S.C. § 7255 (2000)); the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 26, 
42, and 43 U.S.C. ); and the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S. C.). 
83 The Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.). The Act also consists of several pieces of legislation 
including: the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 617 
(codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (2000)); the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 
the Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 683 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, and 42 U.S. C.); the Renewable Energy Resources Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 715 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 
U.S. C.); the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.); the Geothermal Energy Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 763 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); and the Acid 
Precipitation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8905, 
8911-8912 (20QO)). 
84 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15, 16, and 30 U.S.C.). 
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eager independent power producers (lPPs) were to enter the market. The 
success of PURPA revealed that traditional regulation had run its course. 
Generating units, with then existing technologies, could not continue to get 
bigger and commercial nuclear power was not "too cheap to meter." In 
microeconomic terms, the traditional, regulated electric industry had 
reached the end of its scale economies. In other words, unregulated 
producers existed that were willing to supply the market with electricity 
priced lower than the electricity being supplied by incumbent regulated 
utilities, and the new entrants profited by doing so with a little help from 
government. This situation was a free marketer's dream. 
Congress passed PURPA in small part to encourage the growth of 
generation not owned by utility companies as a conservation measure. 
PURPA required local electric utilities to buy the power produced by two 
types of nonutility generators (NUGs), which PURPA calls "qualifying small 
power production facilit[ies]"(QFs)85-small electric generators (eighty 
megawatts or less) and cogenerators.86 Utilities were required to purchase 
excess QF power at that utility's "avoided cost," that is, the price the utility 
would have paid for that power had it generated or bought the power itself. 
Because QFs could produce electricity more cheaply than the local public 
utility, they would produce as much as they could under the statute, use as 
little as they could for their business, and sell as much as they could to the 
local utility, which was obligated to buy at the higher price. 
It is at this point in the regulatory story that transmission became 
noticeably important and that regulators began to rethink their regulation. 
While QFs could sell their power to the local utility, they did not have access 
to the utility's transmission lines to "wheel"87 their power to any other utility 
or end user. Consequently, the creation of QFs had two dramatic effects. 
First, their existence marked the formal introduction of competition into 
generation. Second, the purchase requirement began to force open the 
access door. The program was notably successful. From 1989 through 1993, 
both the number of QFs and installed QF capacity doubled.88 
PURPA stimulated a deeper rethinking of the concept of natural 
monopoly. Under the traditional regulatory scheme, investor owned utilities 
(IOUs) owned and operated generation, transmission, and distribution as 
state-protected monopolies. However, cheaper electricity was available 
because the generation segment of IOUs became too big and costly to 
maintain. In microeconomic terms, marginal cost exceeded average cost 
signaling the failure of traditional rate regulation because the traditional 
formula set rates on average, historic costs rather than market sensitive 
marginal costs. In other words, traditional utilities found it more costly to do 
business because they could not charge market rates and had overbuilt. As a 
result, smaller units and newer technologies became increasingly 
85 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 u.S.C. § 796(17)(C) (2000). 
86 [d. § 824a-3. 
87 "Wheeling" is the use of one utility's transmission system by a generator to sell power to 
another distributor or end user. 
88 ENERGY LAw GROUP, supra note 4, at 12-21. 
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attractive.89 
PURPA thus caused a rethinking of regulation at both ends of the fuel 
cycle. At the generation end, the existence of NUGs indicated that the 
market was competitive. At the buyers' end, consumers wanted to purchase 
the cheaper electricity. Unfortunately, a full-scale move to market rates was 
problematic not only because of the transmission problem, but also because 
market rates had uneven effects on consumers. All consumers are not 
similarly situated. Large consumers have more leverage to bargain for 
discounts because they buy larger quantities of electricity and they can 
switch fuels more easily. Further, small users are often cross-subsidized and 
market prices may not be favorable to them. 
E. The Current Status of Electricity Regulation 
1. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
By the early 1990s, PURPA made two things clear. First, alternative 
power producers wanted to get into the market. Second, the market was not 
as robust as it could be because transmission access was not open due to 
two limiting factors. Nonutility generators, other than QFs, found it difficult 
to enter the market because they had to follow the PUHCA. These 
generators were particularly desirable because they could provide new 
generation at a lower cost. The second constraint was FERC's lack of 
authority to mandate wheeling over transmission lines. 
In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct)90 and partially 
eliminated both constraints. EPAct advanced restructuring by authorizing 
firms exclusively in the business of selling electric energy at wholesale 
(exempt wholesale generators (EWGs)) to be exempt from PUHCA's 
ownership restrictions.91 This exemption set the stage for the development 
of a more competitive and unregulated wholesale market. Second, EPAct 
authorized FERC to order utilities that owned transmission facilities to 
transmit wholesale power over their systems.92 The Act gave FERC broad 
authority, subject to a public interest standard, to order "virtually any 
transmission owning entity in the U.S. to wheel power for wholesale 
transactions at the request of a broad range of potential applicants involved 
in wholesale power transactions. "93 However, EPAct prohibited FERC from 
ordering access to transmission for retail power. 94 EPAct advanced the 
restructuring ball by promoting EWGs and by opening transmission access. 
All that remained was for FERC to implement the Act. 
89 See, e.g., Richard Stavros, Distributed Generation: Last Big Battle for State Regulators?, 
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1999, at 34 (discussing California's difficulty in regulating distributed 
generators). 
90 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
91 Energy Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (2000). 
92 [d. 
93 ReWer H.J.H. Lock & Marlene L. Stein, Electricity Transmission, in 4 ENERGY LAw AND 
TRANSACTIONS § 81.01[4][aj (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 1994). 
94 15 U.S.C. § 792-5b (2000). 
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To best understand the importance and the current status of 
transmission regulation, it is appropriate to understand a little physics. First, 
electrons travel through the network virtually instantaneously. At the speed 
of light, one might say. Second, electricity cannot be stored effectively. 
The first principle of physics is a good thing for consumers, but a 
headache for regulators. As long as the network is open, consumers can 
draw down electricity. The regulatory headache is that no one knows the 
point of origin of any electricity. They simply know how much is in the 
system and how much generators are willing to charge. Nor does anyone 
know the direction that electricity is flowing. In other words,. unlike every 
other product, buyers and sellers are not purchasing a specified product 
from each other. Instead, the industry has created the myth of the "contract 
path."95 
The second principle of physics is good for producers and a headache 
for consumers and regulators. Producers have a steady demand and a need 
for their supply. Consumers and regulators must worry about reliability. 
What all this means for transmission can be summarized in one word-
bottleneck. Consumers want the product, producers want to supply it, and 
transmission owners want to make a profit by controlling access. However, 
because the transmission segment has both monopolistic and monopsonistic 
attributes, profits can become supracompetitive. 
Transmission is pivotal for the operation of the electric industry. In the 
simplest terms, the transmission segment moves electricity from producers 
to consumers. Transmission must also maintain an adequate and reliable 
flow of electricity through the system. Consequently, the transmission 
segment must have adequate capacity, maintain reliability, avoid congestion, 
and do so at reasonable prices with no discrimination. Neither monopolists, 
nor monopsonists think this way-they would rather maximize profits. 
2. FERC InitiativeSJ6 
FERC implemented the EPAct with Order Nos. 88897 and 889.98 Order 
. No. 888 "require[ed] all public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities 
used for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to have on file 
open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs that contain minimum 
terms and conditions for non-discriminatory service."99 Order No. 888 also 
95 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the 
Restructured Electricity IndustIy, 27 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 569, 573 (2000). 
96 This discussion draws on Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in ENERGY LAw GROUP, supra note 
4, at 12-23 to 12-32. 
97 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-DiscriminatOIY 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,544 
(May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
98 Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,737,21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Floyd L. Norton, IV & GregoryW. 
Camet, Electricity: Open Access, Transmission and Comparability, in 4 ENERGY LAw AND 
TRANSACTIONS § 82.01, § 82.04(1) (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2001). 
99 Norton & Camet, supra note 98 § 82.04. 
HeinOnline -- 32 Envtl. L. 455 2002
2002] ELECTRICITY REGULATION 455 
required utilities to "functionally unbundle" their transmission service from 
their generation and power marketing functions, and to provide unbundled 
ancillary transmission services. IOO The unbundling was intended to reduce or 
eliminate opportunities for self-dealing by utilities owning both generation 
. and transmission facilities. Functional unbundling means that the activities 
are treated separately within the corporation without necessarily being put 
into separate corporate entities. 
Utilities were required to file separate tariffs with separate rates, terms, 
and conditions for wholesale generation service, transmission service, and 
any ancillary services. lOi Ancillary services include actions taken to effect 
the transmission, such as scheduling and dispatching, and services 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the transmission system. 102 To ensure 
that a utility does not favor itself with its own transmission facilities, the 
order required that a utility must take transmission service and ancillary 
services for all of its new wholesale sales and purchases of electricity under 
the same tariff that applies to outside users of its transmission.103 
Open transmission on a nondiscriminatory basis is needed to create a 
more robust competitive market in wholesale power by allowing generation 
access to more customers. FERC estimated that open access transmission 
would save U.S. electric consumers between $3.8 and $5.4 billion a year and 
encourage more technical innovation in the industry.104 To help assure 
reliability, the order provided utilities with a fair opportunity to recover 
prudently incurred regulatory costs as well as the costs of making the 
transition to a competitive wholesale market. 
Order No. 889 established an electronic information system to promote 
competition. 105 This system, called OASIS (open access same-time 
information system), provides existing and potential transmission users the 
same access to transmission information that the transmission owner 
eIijoys.106 Order No. 889 also requires public utilities to comply with 
standards of conduct intended to preclude anticompetitive behavior by 
transmission owners, such as favoring affiliated generators or power 
marketers with transmission services. 107 
At the wholesale level, Order Nos. 888 and 889 had a dramatic impact 
on the industry. Since their inception, the: industry has experienced 
significant changes including the development of retail competition in the 
states, the divestiture of generating units by traditional utilities, an increase 
in energy company mergers, a notable increase in the number of power 
marketers and independent generators, and the establishment of 
100 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,552. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 21,580-81. 
103 Id. at 21,552. 
104 Norton & Camet, supra note 98, § 82.04(1); 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,675. 
105 Open Access Same-Time Wonnation System and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,737,21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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independent system operators to manage transmission. 108 Those Orders, 
however, did not address either retail wheeling or the appropriate form for a 
transmission facility. 
The difficult question was how to structure the relationship between 
the transmission and generation portions of a utility's business. Clearly, 
FERC envisioned some sort of regional transmission organization, but the 
exact form it should take was and is unsettled. Nevertheless, FERC 
addressed this issue with Order No. 2000.109 
3. FERC order 2000-Regional Transmission Organizations 
As a result of information learned from PURPA and from the market, 
natural monopoly attention turned to transmission. Also, because the 
electricity industry was dually regulated, restructuring had to proceed on 
both federal and state levels. While a regulatory bright line could be drawn 
between interstate wholesale of electricity and retail sales, that bright line is 
one of political convenience only, not physical reality. Historically, the 
federal government limited its reach to interstate wholesale and left retail 
regulation to the states. Regulatory restructuring has continued to follow 
this division between state and federal regulation. Though· this continued 
allegiance to dual regulation may have made political sense, it does not 
make good economic sense. 
To further industry restructuring, FERC proposed and adopted a rule 
designed to formalize the formation of independent transmission 
organizations under the ·name Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs).1IO RTOs are entities that are independent of the owners of 
generation facilities and manage the transmission systems either as owners 
or as operators.! 11 
In FERC's opinion, Order No. 2000 was necessary because the market 
was insufficiently competitive due to engineering and economic 
inefficiencies and because of continued opportunities for discrimination. 112 
Regarding engineering and economic inefficiencies, FERC found that: 
• The reliability of the bulk power system was being stressed; 
• There were increasing difficulties in computing transmission 
capacity; 
• Regional coordination was desirable for congestion management; 
There was increased uncertainty with transmission planning and 
expansion; and 
• Pancaked rates hindered market development. 113 
108 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order 2000,65 Fed. Reg. 810, 813-15 (Jan. 6, 2000) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35.34). 
109 [d. at 810; see also Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. Pt. 35) (clarifying key terms in Order No. 2000). 
110 65 Fed. Reg. at 81l. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 817. 
113 Transmission rates are "pancaked" when an access charge is made for transmission in 
every jurisdiction the transmission crosses. [d. at 817. 
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Regarding undue discrimination, FERC was concerned with both self-
dealing and the appearance of self-dealingl14 because both retard the 
development of competitive markets. Overt self-dealing occurs when a 
utility owning transmission and generation charges itself a transmission 
charge lower than that charged to other customers, giving it a competitive 
edge. The appearance of self-dealing raises the transaction costs of doing 
business because the market is not seen as reliable, thus reducing efficiency 
gains from competition. 
Transmission owners had no obligation to serve all customers. Even 
though transmission is an essential facility, historically it has not had 
common carrier statuS. 115 The key impediment to an open and competitive 
market is that for the most part the transmission segment is privately owned 
and private owners have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximize 
value. In other words, private owners will raise prices to what the market 
can bear. There is little incentive to give up either ownership or operation. 
To this point, interregional coordination has proceeded on a voluntary 
basis. Historically, the transmission network developed as one might expect. 
At first there was a direct link between Edison's Pearl Street generator and 
its consumers at low voltage direct current. Alternating current allowed for 
longer distance transmission and encouraged consolidation among 
generators, resulting in voluntary interconnections. The first major power 
pool was the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland Interconnection (PJM); 
established to balance load, realize operating economies, save capital 
investment, and enhance system reliability.116 These interconnections have 
extended throughout the country to form three power pools: east and west 
of the Rocky Mountains, and in Texas. These three pools, together with the 
Hydro-Quebec System, form the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC), another voluntary organization, to coordinate operations, planning, 
and transmission. 117 
FERC believes that the voluntary coordination that previously existed is 
no longer effective because the volunteer groups are not vested with the 
broad decision-making authority needed to address larger issues that affect 
an entire region including managing congestion, planning and investing in 
new transmission facilities, pancaking transmission access charges, the 
absence of secondary markets in transmission services, and the possible 
disincentives created by the level and structure of transmission rates. 118 
While policy makers might readily agree on the necessary goals for the 
competitive performance of the transmission segment, there is little 
consensus on the means of getting there. Into this fray steps FERC with 
114 Id. at 817-18. 
115 Conunon carrier is defined as the situation in which the government has the authority to 
order a finn to submit to entry and exit regulation. In other words, conunon carriers must serve 
all customers without price discrimination. See DANIEL L. BRENNER, LAw AND REGULATION OF 
COMMON CARRIERS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 35 (1992). 
116 Lock & Stein, supra note 93, at § 81.01. 
117 See NERC, at http//:www.nerc.com (last visited Mar. 17,2002) (describing the structure 
ofNERC). 
118 Regional Transmission Organization, 1999 FERC Lexis 2692, at 34 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
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Order No. 2000, which set the parameters for establishing RTOs. Order No. 
2000 describes two fundamental approaches to creating RTOs-the non-
profit independent system operator (ISO), and the for-profit independent 
transmission company CTransco)y9 Although both forms of organization 
would have independent boards, the ISO is a. non-profit organization 
committed to non-discriminatory service and the Transco is driven by profit. 
Both forms present complications, and there are arguments pro and con, as 
will be described below. 
4. Organizational Form: ISo'vs. Transco 
FERC Order No. 2000 establishes the parameters for any RTO, which 
may take the form of the non-profit ISO or the for-profit Transco. 120 FERC 
set four minimum standards for any RTO. An RTO must have: 
• Independence 
• Scope and Regional Configuration 
• Operational Authority 
• Short-Term Reliability 
The Order also sets out the minimum functions an RTO must perform: 
• Tariff administration and design 
• Congestion management 
• OASIS participation 
• Market monitoring 
• Planning and expansion 
• Interregional coordination 
Each of these characteristics and functions is explained in great detail 
in the Order. 121 The listing is sufficient to raise questions about the form of 
organization the RTO should take. To date, Order Nos. 2000 and 2000-A have 
been interpreted so that the RTO can be an ISO or a Transco. 122 Yet so far 
FERC has authorized only ISOs. Curiously, the arguments in favor and 
against each form are simply arguments with little or no data and limited 
rhetorical power.123 Finally, FERC Order No. 2000 explicitly says that no 
simple form is preferred and, complicating matters a bit, the Order has been 
interpreted by various commentators as "preferring" one method over the 
other. 124 
119 Region Transmission Organizations, Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 835 (Jan. 6, 2000) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35.34). 
120 [d. at 811. The rule required transmission-owning utilities to file an RTO· proposal with 
FERC by October 15, 2000, or file an explanation as to why they cannot. The order further 
required that the RTO must commence operations by December 15, 2001. [d. This date has been 
postponed. Electricity Market Design and Structure, 97 F.E.R.C. ~ 61,146 (2001). 
121 See also LEONARD S. HYMAN, WHAT'S INSIDE FERC's TRANSMISSION POlley: A GUIDE TO 
ORDER 2000 (2000) (discussing the functions of RTO). 
122 Jeremiah D. Lambert, Order 2000: A Subtle But Clear Preference for [SOs, PuB. UTIL. 
FORT., Mar. 1,2000, at 36. 
123 [d.; Curt L. Hebert Jr. & Joshua Z. Rokach, Order 2000: Exposing Myths on What FERC 
Really Wants, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1,2000, at 42,47. 
124 Compare Lambert, supra note 122, at 36 with Hebert & Rokach, supra note 123 at 47" 
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5. ISO 
The central force behind the ISO is that it is a non-profit operator of the 
transmission system. As such, the ISO owns no facilities. Rather, it operates 
transmission facilities that are made available to it by generating units. The 
ISO exists to serve the public interest in having reasonably priced, reliable 
electricity available for consumers. 
The situation of a non-profit as a non-owner operator of transmission 
units presents certain complications. The first complication is its 
relationship with the generators. The ISO must be "independent" of a 
generator, specifically to avoid self-dealing.125 Consequently, its Board of 
Directors must have no conflicts of interest with the generators. How far can 
this go? At what point does an independent board have adequate 
understanding of the industry and sufficient incentive relative to the 
generators such that it can exercise influence over the generators or the 
owners of the transmission company to invest in maintenance and 
expansion of those facilities? 
These questions present difficult problems for the ISO. The Board of 
Directors of the ISO will have a fiduciary duty running either to the state or 
to the federal government, whichever gives the ISO its charter. 
Consequently, the Board has some motivation to act independently, and they 
have some motivation to keep the ISO in business, which is to say to keep 
electricity running through the system. Although at least two commentators 
argue that FERC's principles for the ISO apply equally to Transcos, most 
commentators make assertions about which form is the superior form of 
organization. 126 Not surprisingly, most industry arguments are made in favor 
of the for-profit Transco. The arguments against the ISO generally focus on 
insufficient incentives. The insufficient incentives come from hypotheses 
about 'profit motivation. Critics argue, for example, that while an ISO may 
have an incentive to maintain the short-term reliability of the system, its 
distance from ownership of facilities gives it little incentive or control over 
long-term reliability. Following this analysis, critics argue that the ISO has 
little ability or incentive to make capital investments in plants, innovate 
through the use of new technologies, or engage in cost-setting for 
management efficiencies. 127 
6. Transco 
The arguments critical of ISOs mirror the arguments in favor of 
Transcos. Again, the central variable for the Transco is that it is a for-profit 
company that both owns and operates transmission assets. Its for-profit 
125 Hebert & Rokach, supra note 123, at 48. 
126 Stephen Angle & George Cannon, Jr., Independent Transmission Companies: The For-
Profit Alternative in Competitive Electric Markets, 19 ENERGY L.J. 229, 239-40 (1998). 
127 SHIMON AWERBUCH El' AL., UNLOCKING THE BENEFITS OF RESTRUCTURING: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
TRANSMISSION 11-55 (1999); Angle & Cannon, supra note 126, at 238-39; Robert J. Michaels, The 
Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 ENERGY L.J. 233, 258-59 (1999). 
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motivation is designed to maximize the value of the company and to return 
income and value to shareholders. Shareholders, of course, elect the Board 
of Directors and, presumably, conflict of interest rules will prevent unfair 
advantages to generators. Similarly, the incentives for the Transco mirror 
the disincentives for the ISO. Because the Transco is profit-motivated, it 
must necessarily invest in plant maintenance and innovation. It must also 
maintain short-term and long-term reliability. The arguments in favor of the 
Transco, given its profit motivation, however, should not be taken too far. It 
is also the case that a profit-driven Transco may pay more attention to short-
term gains, may cut costs in a way that affects reliability, and may price 
discriminate where it is economically beneficial to do SO.128 
The non-profit nature of the ISO presents problems, as does the for-
profit nature of the Transco. However, alternatives are available. One 
alternative is to engage in a transitional movement starting with an ISO then 
moving to the Transco. The other alternative is to create an ISO or a Transco 
and regulate the rates with performance-based ratemaking that allows a 
sharing of profits between ratepayers and shareholders. 129 
The difficult question for state and federal regulators and for industry 
actors is which form of RTO to choose. Not surpriSingly, industry actors 
favor Transcos. Regardless of form, however, Transcos and ISOs must 
achieve five goals. Every RTO must 1) have sufficient capacity, 2) provide 
reliable service, 3) manage congestion, 4) not discriminate, and 5) offer 
reasonable prices. The chart below compares ISO and Transcos by first 
listing their characteristics and then listing the incentives driving each form 
of organization. To be sure, at this early date, the checkrnarks in each 
column are guesses. The guesses are based upon arguments made in the 
literature. It may very well be that either form performs well or poorly 
because of the strange nature of the organization. 
One can argue vociferously, as many have, that the Transco is better 
situated to build transmission lines because of its for-profit motive. It is not 
obviously the case that Trancsco has sufficient assets or economic leverage 
to do so. Similarly, while one might argue that the ISO should be in the 
position to offer reliable service at reasonable prices because of its stated 
mission under government charter, it is equally unclear that it has the 
economic leverage to force generators to sell to it in sufficient quantities to 
keep prices low while providing reliable service. 
We may very well have worked ourselves into a situation in this country 
in which there is a significant lag between the construction of new 
generation and transmission systems and the full and reliable operation of 
an RTO. This lag is due in part to the problem of stranded costs. Stranded 
costs, privately owned utilities argue, must be recouped before they can 
participate as full market actors, largely because they are saddled with costs 
as incumbents with which new entrants are not burdened. This argument 
128 Koch, supra note 95, at 590-97. 
129 AWERBACH ET AL., supra note 127, at 148; Curt L. Hebert Jr., The Quest for an Inventive 
Utility Regulatory Agenda, 19 ENERGY L.J. 1, 13-22 (1998); Angle & Cannon, supra note 126, at 
249-63. 
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means that until stranded costs are recouped and the playing field is leveled 
between incumbents and new entrants, there will be a lag between 
investment in new generation and construction of new transmission. The 
experience in California in 2000 demonstrates that this problem can become 
dramatic as demand surges ahead of supply and as price spikes ensue. 
Consequently, caution must be used when comparing ISOs to Transcos this 
early in the restructuring of the electric industry.130 
ISO vs. Transco 
ISO Transco 
CHARACTERISTICS • Non-profit • For-profit 
• Non-owner • Owner operator 
operator • Independent 
• Independent "shareholder" board 
"stakeholder" • Fiduciary duty to 
board shareholder 
• Fiduciary duty to 
charter 
INCENTIVES 
Short-term reliability t/ 
Long-term reliability t/ 
Capital investment t/ 
Innovation t/ 
Planning t/ 
Reasonable prices t/ 
Maintenance t/ 
Recapitulating arguments in the literature, it would seem that the ISO 
may have an edge on short-term reliability, given the mandate of its charter, 
and the ISO may have more of an incentive to keep prices reasonable. 
Likewise, because of its for-profit status, the Transco, assuming that it has 
some economic leverage over investments, may promise long-term 
reliability, innovation, and planning, as well as have an incentive to maintain 
the system as would anyone owning plant and equipment, unlike the ISO. 
Nevertheless, two points should be emphasized regarding the corporate 
form of the transmission company. First, it is extremely unlikely that this 
part of the industry will become competitive or even contestably so within 
the short or mid-terms. Neither new technologies nor distributed generation 
threaten the monopoly position of electric transmission. Second, the 
corporate forms alone are largely irrelevant to achieving the goals of 
reliability, re!lSonable pncmg, congestion management, and 
nondiscrimination. Rules and incentives can be fashioned to achieve each of 
these goals. In short, the real fight is political in nature and takes place on 
two fronts. 
130 Koch, supra note 95, at 581. 
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The first front involves federalism. What is the politically appropriate 
sharing of power between the federal and state governments? Does the old 
"bright line" hold?131 Even though we are in an era of devolution, it is odd 
that state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) should exercise controlling 
authority over transmission when regional grids are necessary. 
Unfortunately, FERC Order No. 2000 does not mandate RTOs and has no 
real enforcement teeth. The allocation of political authority is an open issue. 
The second political front is between industry and regulators as they 
negotiate both the acceptable corporate form for the transco and the 
governing rules. Central to either choice of governance form is economic 
leverage. Which form has sufficient economic leverage to encourage 
investment, innovation, and maintenance in facilities? Also, which form can 
ensure capacity and ~'regulate" prices? 
7. Is Transmission a Natural Monopoly? 
Regardless of the natural monopoly skeptics, electric utilities were 
regulated under the political-economic concept of natural monopoly with 
the regulatory belief that one utility in a given area could provide cheaper 
service than multiple providers. At the end of the twentieth century, 
policymakers have witnessed the erosion of the natural monopoly idea as 
the electricity infrastructure was built and the traditional rate formula began 
to have perverse economic effects. Consequently, industry and regulators 
noted competition at the generation end and are now focusing on 
transmission. The question is fairly raised whether the transmission segment 
is a natural monopoly or whether it is subject to competitive forces. The 
simple answer is that for the foreseeable future transmission is a natural 
monopoly. 
Certainly, transmission looks like a typical bottleneck in a network 
industry. But there are two complementary ways to test whether it functions 
as a natural monopoly. First, does the transmission firm exercise market 
power? In other words, can it set supracompetitive prices? Second, is the 
transmission market competitive or contestable? 
Recently, critics have argued that transmission is not a natural 
monopoly because these firms do not exercise market power and are 
increasingly subject to competition. 132 Regarding market power, the authors 
argue that the transmission line owner does not necessarily have the 
monopoly power to charge whatever it wants. l33 
Maybe, but this argument overdescribes monopoly power and 
underassesses the role of the transmission price. First, monopoly power is 
not "whatever" anyone wants to charge. Instead-and the literature is 
clear-it is a supracompetitive price. Clearly, a firm can set a price higher 
than a competitive price and lower than "whatever" it might like and still be 
131 See New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct 1012 (2002) (addressing the continuing validity of the 
bright line test and FERC authority over transmission). 
132 AWERBUCH, ET AL., supra note 127, at 15. 
133 [d. 
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exercising monopoly power. Also, the cost of transportation represents 
roughly seven percent of a utility bill. l34 Consequently, at the margin it may 
very well be that the transmission rate can be a deal breaker. But this is not 
a frequent occurrence. In this regard, the transmission charge functions 
much like a real estate broker's commission. In some instances, that 
commission is bargained down or shared, but rarely. For transmission 
operators, however, the price contains their profits. 
Natural monopoly opponents also argue that the transmission market 
itself is competitive or contestable due to new technologies that would 
enable generators who are dissatisfied with transmission charges to move 
closer to their end users through "distributed generation,"l35 or end users 
themselves would become self-generators. 136 Thus, they argue, the 
transmission market is contestable. There are two responses to this 
argument. First, such moves simply have not happened in significant 
numbers because the transaction costs are high. Second, contestable market 
theory has proven to be less powerful than promised, particularly in the 
airline industry where it started. 137 The general consensus is that for now, 
and for the foreseeable future, transmission is a bottleneck and operates as a 
natural monopoly. This is a position adopted by these same critics elsewhere 
in their writings. 138 
IV. ENERGY POLICY 
The United States's energy economy can be characterized as one-half 
oil and one-half electricity. The oil and electricity industries share common 
features. Both are large, capital-intensive industlies, and both provide 
products that consumers treat as indispensable for their daily lives. 139 Small 
consumers heat their homes with natural gas and drive cars with gasoline. 
Larger industrial consumers use oil and natural gas fuel stocks in the 
production process. For small consumers, electricity has perhaps an even 
more significant impact because they need electricity to turn on the lights, 
open the refrigerator, or switch on a computer. 
As a matter of the regulatory state, the oil industry is largely 
134 Id. at 2, 42. 
135 Id. at 15, 47-52. 
136 Id. at 15, 27. 
137 Compare Elizabeth E. Bailey & W. Baumol, Deregulation and the theory of Contestable 
Markets, 1 YALE J. REG. 111 (1984) (supporting the theory of controllable markets as an 
alternative to deregulation) with BRIAN HAVEL, IN SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAw AND POIJCY FOR A 
NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 199-225 (1997) and Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating 
"Deregulation" of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories and 
Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1989) (analyzing the problems airline 
deregulation has caused). 
138 AWERBACH, ET AL., supra note 127, at 19 ("Trinsmission bottlenecks that prevent the 
import of competitively priced electricity allow local generators to exercise monopoly power 
and to overcharge consumers."). 
139 To some small extent, oil and electricity are'ihterrelated because oil is used to generate 
3% of the country's electricity. NAT. ENERGY POIJCY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POIJCY 1-9 
(May 2001) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY POIJCY) available at http://whitehouse.gov.energy. 
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unregulated at the retail level while electricity is heavily regulated 
throughout its production, distribution, and end use. Consumers recognize 
the distinction because as they drive to any gas station they fill their cars up 
at unregulated prices, whereas their monthly electricity bill has gone 
through a price-setting process. Why is it that the retail price of gasoline is 
unregulated and society sees it as an indisperisable part of life where 
electricity is not? There are two explanations. The first is that, while we are 
in the midst of electricity restructuring, we have not deregulated prices at 
the retail level, although plans to do so seem appropriate if not in the 
immediate future. The other is that electricity is a unique product because it 
cannot be stored-it must always be available. 
It may be fair to say that electricity is even more indispensable than 
gasoline, particularly in today's wired economy. Certainly, electricity's 
importance has grown. In the past, an electric outage meant that the TV and 
refrigerator were off. Rarely, however, did food spoil and the second half of 
the game was yet to be played when the electricity waS turned back on. 
Computers are different entities. Without proper backup, down time can 
mean significant data losses, not only in our homes, but in banks, work 
places, and in the national defense system, for example. There is no doubt 
that the economy will become more wired before it becomes less so, thus 
maintaining, if not increasing, the significance of electricity. 
It is odd then that, as the demand for electricity increases, additions to 
generation may lag behind or remain level, yet transmission lags further 
behind both. This situation is understandable because investors fmd it risky 
to invest in an uncertain transmission market. Thus the problem: there is no 
workable competitive market in electricity, and it is the movement from 
large-scale, heavy-handed government regulation to such a competitive 
market that is the object of restructuring. The best guess is that the 
transition will take considerable time beyond the conception of the FERC 
staff quotation that opened this Article. 
A. Dominant Energy Policy 
For most of the twentieth century, the United States developed and 
followed a dominant energy policy.140 That policy is not to be found in any 
one document nor is it a consciously coordinated whole. 141 Yet the policy 
consists of large scale, capital intensive energy projects, significantly 
favoring fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas. Although there have 
been attempts throughout the twentieth century to coordinate and develop a 
140 Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. Cow. L. 
REV. 355, 369-76 (1990); Joseph P. Tomain, Energy Policy Advice for the New Administration, 
46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63 (1989); Joseph P. Tomain, Toward a Sustainable Energy-
Environmental Policy, in ENERGY LAw GROUP, supra note 4, at 6-2 to 6-3; see also JOHN CLARK, 
ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: FOSSIL fuEL POLICIES 1900-1946 (1987); RICHARD H. K. 
VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A STUDY OF BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
0~.· . 
141 See Joseph P. Tomain, Institutionalized Conflicts Between Law and Policy, 22 HOUS. L. 
REV. 661 (1985) (discussing inter-branch, interstate, and state-federal conflicts in energy policy). 
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comprehensive national energy plan, none has materialized even after the 
creation of the Department of Energy, which is required to report a 
comprehensive national energy plan to Congress. annually. 142 The Bush 
administration, under the guidance of Vice President Dick Cheney, has 
adhered to the dominant model with its recent National Energy Policy.143 
Bush's National Energy Policy starts with the premise that America faces the 
most serious energy shortage since the oil embargos of the 1970s. Those 
shortages were dramatized by the California electricity crisis of the summer 
of 2000. The plan projects growing shortfalls over the next twenty years and 
then recognizes the fact that energy is both a necessary staple of a healthy 
economy and necessary for national security and our standard of living. 144 
The National Energy Plan adopts modem language stating that energy 
policies must promote conservation and be environmentally sensitive. 
However, the Plan is firmly within the dominant model. It adds a new 
dimension to contemporary energy policy by requiring further maintenance 
and development of our infrastructure as well as an expansion of energy 
supplies. 145 
Not surprisingly, the Plan calls for a development of oil resources, 
something dear to both President Bush and Vice President Cheney.146 The 
issue that drew the most press and criticism involves drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge. Depending upon whose statistics you use, this, 
development of domestic oil resources would increase available oil from 3.2 
to 16 billion barrels of oil. 147 
142 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7l01-7382f (2000). 
143 NATIONAL ENERGY Pouey, supra note 139. 
144 Id. at viii. 
145 Id. at 7-1 to 7-18. 
146 Id. at 1-10 to 1-13. 
147 Even statistics from the same source are susceptible to political spin. Compare the 
quotations from President Bush's National Energy Plan with a report from the. Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which both use USGS data: 
The total quantity of recoverable oil within the entire assessment area is estimated to be 
between 5.7 and 16 billion barrels (95 percent and 5 percent probability range) with a 
mean value of lOA billion barrels. The mean estimate of lOA billion barrels is just below 
the amount produced to date from North America's largest filed, Prudhoe Bay, since 
production began 23 years ago. Peak production from ANWR could be between 1 and 1.3 
million barrels a day and account for more than 20 percent of all U.S. oil production. 
ANWR production could equal 46 years of current oil imports from Iraq. 
Id. at 5-9. Compare with: 
Proponents of drilling maintain that 16 billion barrels of oil would be pumped from the 
Arctic Refuge coastal plain. The claim is a gross exaggeration. . . . 1n fact, the USGS 
calculated only a 5 percent chance that 16 billion barrels of oil are in the coastal plain 
and its surrounding area. Second, only a portion of that oil could be recovered 
economically .... The 3.2 billion barrels that the USGS estimates would be economically 
recoverable from the Arctic Refuge is less than half a year's supply of oil for the United 
States, even at current rates of consumption. Over the projected 50-year life of the oil 
field, the refuge would contribute less than 1 percent of the oil Americans will consume. 
Production of oil there would peak in 2027 at 150 million barrels a year, providing less 
than 2 percent of projected U.s. consumption that year .... 
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The dominant policy has not been without its critics, particularly over 
the last forty years. While the twentieth century can point to major 
conservation efforts, including the creation of the National Park Service 
under such personages as Teddy Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, the real 
challenges to the dominant policy came from environmentalists such as 
Rachel Carson148 and AIdo Leopold. 149 In addition to these calls for 
environmental sensitivity, the passage of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPAY5O in 1970, and the creation of advocacy groups such as the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund 
drew significant attention to the negative externalities (i.e. pollution) of the 
dominant energy policy. 
The task remained, however, to link energy and environmental policies 
. in some way. The process of bringing the two fields together began in the 
early 1970s, most notably with the report from the Club of Rome warning 
about dangers to the human environment from continued use of fossil 
fuels. 151 The links between energy and the environment were also made by 
Amory Lovins in Soft Energy Paths. 152 Finally, one of the most important and 
enduring documents linking energy and the environment came with the 
concept of sustainable development made most visible with the publication, 
Our Common Future. 153 
Under the direction of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Norway's Prime Minster, Gro Brundtland, undertook a major study on the 
connection between the need for energy growth and the protection of the 
environment. He pioneered the idea of sustainable development defined as 
development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."I54 Sustainable 
development not only bridges economic and environmental issues, it also 
bridges the challenges faced by developed, developing, and underdeveloped 
countries, in terms of both social and economic advancement. During the 
Clinton administration, the concept of sustainable development appeared in 
his National Energy Policy reports.155 Sustainable development even makes 
NAT'L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY POUCY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2001). 
See also, Paul Krugman, Not a Fuels Errand, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at A19 ("Drilling in 
Alaska would make no difference worth mentioning. H). 
148 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
149 Awo LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). 
150 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000). 
151 DONElLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LiMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT OF THE CLUB OF ROME'S 
PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972). 
152 AMORY B. loVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE (1977). 
153 WORLD COMM'N ON THE ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FuTURE (1987). 
,154 [d. at 43. 
155 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY POUCY PLAN (1995) (outlining the 
Clinton administration's sustainable energy policy); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, COMPREHENSIVE 
NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1998) (describing goals and objectives for implementing a 
sustainable energy policy); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A 
NEW CONSENSUS FOR THE FuTURE (1996) (advising President Clinton on sustainable 
development). 
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an appearance in President Bush's National Energy Plan, which opens: 
"America must have an energy policy that plans for the future, but meets the 
needs of today. I believe that we can develop our natural resources and 
protect our environment."156 Nevertheless, the administration's National 
Energy Policy is well within the dominant model. 
The Natural Resources. Defense Council (NRDC) offers a distinctly 
different picture of our energy future. 157 NRDC emphasizes conservation 
over exploration and increased fuel efficiency over increased energy 
production. l58 NRDC's approach, however, does use concepts and language 
that bring energy and environmental policies closer together by looking at 
economic regulatory tools, from tax incentives to market-based 
justifications for using conservation measures. NRDC also argues that 
environmental protection is paramount, and energy policy should not 
consider drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or in sensitive 
offshore areas that protect sensitive onshore public lands.159 Additionally, 
increases in energy efficiency and conservation promise significant energy 
savings. 160 
Much of the current energy legislation in Congress is remarkably 
comprehensive, covering the full range of the energy spectrum. However, 
most of these proposals are unlikely to see the light of day. 
The 107th Congress has been actively involved with the introduction of 
energy legislation for a nUmber of reasons. The California crisis was 
certainly a stimulant as is the fact of a new Presidential administration. All 
these bills were introduced prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001. They remain under discussion, and the issue of national security is 
ever present. The bills take two basic forms. Most of the bills are 
comprehensive and mirror existing discussions over energy policy. The 
second type are much more narrowly tailored to specific concerns about the 
restructuring of the electricity industry. 
In the Senate, Senator Frank Murkowski introduced the National 
Energy Security Act of 2001. 161 The purpose of the bill is to protect the 
energy and security of the United States by decreasing dependence on 
foreign oil to fifty percent by the year 2011. In 2000, the United States 
produced 9.4 million barrels per day and imported 11.1 million barrels per 
day.162 The bill also seeks to enhance the use of renewable resources, 
conserve energy, and improve energy efficiency by increasing domestic 
energy supplies while improving environmental quality.l63 While the bill does 
156 NATIONAL ENERGY POIJCY, supra note 138, at title page. 
157 NAT'L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL.; supra note 146, at iv-ix. 
158 [d. at iv. 
159 [d. at v-vi. 
160 See, e.g., Amory B. Lovins & L. Hunter Lovins, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 28,2002, at 18, 19 ("By 
2000, reduced 'energy intensity' (compared with 1975) was providing 40 percent of all U.S. 
energy services .... Since 1996, saved energy has been the nation's fastest-growing major 
'source. '"). 
161 S. 389, 107th Congo (2001). 
162 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 122 (Aug. 2001). 
163 S.389, 107th Congo § 2 (2001). 
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address issues concerning conseIVation and the environment, this is an 
administration bill that focuses on oil production on the outer continental 
shelf, the continental United States, and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 
It also extends the Price-Anderson Actl64 for nuclear power, while loosening 
hydroelectric licensing proceedings.165 In short, Senate Bill 389 is an 
example of the dominant model of energy policy. 
The counterweight to S. 389 is the Comprehensive and Balanced Energy 
Policy Act of 2001,166 introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman. The Democratic 
energy bill proposes the establishment of the National Commission on 
Energy and Climate Change as well as an interagency working group on 
clean energy technology transfer. 167 While it addresses many of the same 
areas as the Republican bill, it emphasizes the need to pay more attention to 
renewables and distributed generation, energy efficiency, and the 
improvement of environmental qUality. 
In the House, key legislation includes the Comprehensive Energy 
Research and Technology Act of 2001,168 the Energy Security Act of 2001,169 
and the Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001 (SAFE Act of 2001).170 
The House proposals are also very comprehensive. The Comprehensive 
Energy Research and Technology Act sets goals for research, development, 
demonstration, and commercial application in the areas of: 1) conseIVation 
and efficiency in regard to buildings,. industry, and transportation, 2) 
renewable energy in such areas . as hydrogen, geothermal, hydropower, 
power, and photovoltaic, as well as solar, wind, and other renewables, 3) 
nuclear energy, 4) fossil energy, and 5) science.171 The Energy Security Act 
attempts to address oil and gas development as well as the improvement of 
federal management, including development on the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge. 172 In Addition, the SAFE Act of 2001 encompasses the 
comprehensive Energy Research and Technology Act of 2001, as well as the 
Energy Security Act, and engages in a broad range of traditional and non-
traditional fuels development. 173 Nevertheless, like the Republican Senate 
legislation, this bill tends to follow the dominant model. 
The more specific legislation is exemplified by the National Electricity 
Reliability Act. 174 While this specific legislation also appears in the more 
comprehensive legislation, its purpose is narrowed to the creation of an 
entity known as the Electric Reliability Organization, discussed below. 
164 Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2001, 8. 389, 107th Congo §§ 40-409 (2001). 
165 Hydroelectric Licensing Process Improvement Act of2001, 8.389, 107th Congo §§ 721-726 
(2001). 
166 8. 597, 107th Congo (2001). 
167 [d. at §§ 101-107, 111. 
168 H.R. 2460, 107th Congo (2001). 
169 H.R. 2436, 107th Congo (2001). 
170 H.R. 4, 107th Congo (2001). 
171 H.R. 2460, 107th Congo (2001). 
172 H.R. 2436, 107th Congo (2001). 
173 H.R. 4, 107th Congo (2001). 
174 H.R., 312, 107th Congo (2001). 
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B. Electricity Policy 
As noted earlier, electricity constitutes about half of our energy 
economy. Most of the country's electricity is generated by coal, which of 
course, involves the most significant environmental issues. 175 Nuclear 
power, with its uncertain future, produces about twenty percent of our 
electricity, with natural gas and hydropower producing approximately 
sixteen percent respectively.176 Alternatives such as solar, wind, geothermal, 
and biomass account for about two percent. 177 Another fact worth noting is 
the growing contribution to the electric power. sector by non-utility 
generators. At the end of last year, non-utilities accounted for thirty percent 
of the generation.178 Non-utility generators are made up of new entrants into 
the generation market as well as the unbundled generation assets of 
traditional utilities. In addition, as the electricity industry develops there will 
be changes in how electricity is generated and by which fuels. 179 
Restructuring the electric industry is a synonym for more competition 
and this involves two major activities. On the regulatory side, there must be 
less price setting at wholesale and retail levels and more reliance on 
competitive markets for setting electricity prices. On the industry side, there 
is an unbundling through corporate restructuring. Under the traditional 
regulatory scheme, IOUs generated, transmitted, and distributed electricity 
through state-protected monopolies. Today, IOUs spin off assets, often 
generation assets, while retaining distribution operations with continued 
uncertainty about the future of transmission. Since monopoly or market 
power is anathema to competition, the IOUs must become competitive 
actors, and markets must be created to allow competition in spot and 
futures prices in order to send correct price signals so that they can properly 
anticipate demand and plan investments for the development of reliable, 
fairJy priced electricity. 
If our electricity economy is going to move to more competitive 
markets, restructuring must address and conquer two major issues. The first 
involves pricing in terms of spot and futures markets so that proper price 
signals can be given to producers and consumers, so that investments can be 
made to every segment of the industry.180 The second is that the current 
transmission bottleneck is addressed so that electricity can move to 
consumers. 
175 Id. § 215. 
176 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 162, at 222. 
177 Energy Info. Admin., MonthlY'Update, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 1. 
178 Id. at 1. 
179 New technologies such as distributed generation and fuel cells directly affect 
transmission. New patterns of energy use (for example, an increased use of natural gas and 
possible increase in nuclear power) directly affect energy policy more generally. See Suedeen 
Kelly, Domestic Energy Policy in the Era of Electric IndustIy Deregulation, 47 RocKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. § 1.02(2)(a), 1-33 (2001) (describing the Bush administration's energy policy focus on 
encouraging new supplies of energy). 
180 MATTHEW J. MOREY, ENSURING SUFFICIENT GENERATION CAPACITY: DURING THE TRANSITION 
TO COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 32-33 (Nov. 2001), at http://www.eei.org/issues/comp-
reg/ensuring. pdf. 
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The restructuring movement has presented two significant challenges 
to the transmission segment. The fIrst challenge involves the increased use 
of the existing system. The current system was designed for a very different 
world. That world was one in which integrated IOUs transmitted electricity 
to local utilities for distribution, and basically were point-to-point transfers. 
As the grids grew, connections were made for back-up and peaking power, 
but neither federal regulation nor industry design mandated wheeling over 
another utility's lines. 181 Instead, interconnections and pooling were 
voluntary.182 As restructuring continued, it became clear that the central 
piece needed to solve the competitive electricity market puzzle involved 
access to the transmission system. With FERC Order Nos. 888, 889, and 
2000, open access became the centerpiece of restructuring. However, as 
access opens and competition increases. the number of transactions rise, 
thus putting a strain on a transmission system designed roughly for point to 
point deliveries. 
Today the transmission system faces congestion in various parts of the 
country as people vie for the best deals, spot markets are activated, and 
futures contracts gain in importance. Increased competition is highly likely 
for two reasons. First, as IOUs unbundle and as transmission access opens, 
more consumers will be looking for more deals, thus putting more pressure 
on the existing system. In addition, generation is increasing while 
transmission investment is not keeping pace. It is estimated that demand for 
electricity will grow twenty-fIve percent over the next decade,l83 while 
planned transmission facilities show only a four percent growth during the 
same period. l84 It is further estimated that $56 billion must be invested 
during the present decade just to maintain the present transmission 
capacity. 185 . 
In one sense, a more competitive market ought to be seen as a welcome 
development, and to an extent it is. The problem remains regarding 
investment in that system. Given the unsettled nature of the structure of 
RTOs-whether they should be operated as non-profIt or for-profIt 
companies-investment decisions are diffIcult to value and to make. Once a 
product becomes standardized, however, investment decisions come easier. 
In the electricity industry, standardization comes in the form of reliability. 
Consumers must be able to rely on the availability of electricity. 
The most promising development on the restructuring front is the 
creation of an electric reliability organization (ERO) to maintain 
transmission standards and, hopefully, improve reliability. The ERO simply. 
extends the mission of NERC. In fact, NERC is the primary architect of the 
181 Lock & Stein, supra note 93 at § 82.01(2). 
182 Id. § 81.02. 
183 GALE & O'DR1SCOLL, supra note 69, at 13. 
184 ROBERT W. GEE, EXPANDING OUR ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION NETWORK: CONSUMERS HAVE AN 
INTEREST AT STAKE 15 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.eeLorg/issuesinewstrransmission_ 
Consumers. pdf. 
185 ERIC HiRST & BRENDAN KIRBY, TRANSMISSION PLANNING FOR A RESTRUCTURING U.S. 
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 9-10 (June 2001) available at 
http://www.eeLorg/issuesicomp_reg/transmission_ hirst.pdf. 
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ERO. As exemplified in the proposed National Electricity Reliability Act, 186 
the ERO would report to FERC and would serve a function much like the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The ERO would set organization 
standar~ for the reliable operation of a bulk-power system in the public 
interest. The standards are to be developed through a process that is open, 
balances interests, and observes due process. 187 RTOs throughout the 
country would be members of the ERO. Standards that the ERO sets would 
be mandatory and enforceable unlike the voluntary standards of NERC. 
FERC would be the supervising authority of the ERO and appeals would be 
allowed. ISS 
At this point, FERC is pushing for the development of four or as many 
as six regional RTOs, all of whom would be members of the ERO.189 The 
reason that the standards for connection, maintenance, and operation need 
to be rationalized is so that the price signals would be constant, there is no 
discrimination in favor of affiliates or against new entrants, and the market 
can develop. 
It is clear that restructuring from traditional rate regulation to a more 
competitive market involves stepped transitions. The first step is to require 
open access at nondiscriminatory prices. The second step is to encourage or 
require unbundling. The third step is to create markets for prices. The 
current step is to rationalize transmission standards for the operation of the 
system. It may very well be the case that in the future consumers will be able 
to make choices about electricity providers the way they stop at the gas 
station to fIll up their tars, but that electricity economy remains in the 
future, despite the FERC staffs best guess. 
V. CONCLUSION: FIvE FuTuRE CHALLENGES 
Over the last century, government regulation of the electricity industry 
has fulfilled its mission of expanding its infrastructure. Now competition 
promises benefits in terms of products and prices, services, and innovation. 
The next regulatory generation will be charged with managing the transition 
and monitoring the newly emerging markets. 
The movement to restructure the electric industry was driven by a 
desire to allow consumers to reach cheaper electricity, reduce the high cost 
of regulation, eliminate or reduce heavy-handed price setting regulations, 
increase economic efficiency, and promote competitive markets. There is no 
question that these reforms are large and dramatic. Success can be 
evaluated by two criteria. First, is the market more competitive (efficient)? 
186 H.R. 312, 107th Congo (2001) . 
. 187 [d. § 215(d)(3)(G). 
ISS Electricity Transmission: Hearing Before the House Subconun. on Energy and Air Quality, 
107th Congo (Dec. 13, 2001) (statement of Michehl R. Gent, President and CEO, North American 
Electric Reliability Council); National Energy Policy: Hearing Before the S. Conun. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 107th Congo (July 25, 2001) (statement of David N. Cook, General 
Counsel, North American Electricity Reliability Council). 
189 See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Regional Transmission Organization Activities 
(Mar. 4, 2002), at http://www.ferc.govlElectric/rto/post_rto.htm. 
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Second, are the benefits of competition greater than the transaction costs of 
restructuring? There are, in addition, distributional issues fairly raising the 
question-who are the winners and losers in the restructuring? More 
specifically, while it appears that large consumers should see lower 
electricity bills, it is not clear that small consumers will as well. 
During this immediate regulatory period there are five significant issues 
that must be resolved for the electric industry in general. The first is 
determining how stranded costs are valued and how they are to be paid. Few 
policy analysts seriously disagree that the investments utilities made in 
order to comply with and satisfy regulatory requirements should go 
uncompensated, even though there is little constitutional support for the 
claim,190 The controversy over nuclear plant cancellations addressed exactly 
. this issue with no clear guidance as to how coutts and regulators should 
assess whether compensation is. due. 191 Stranded costs present the same 
difficulty, involving estimates ranging from a low of $10 to $20 billion to a 
high of $500 billion. 192 The range of estimates indicates part of the problem. 
Utilities, naturally, want to identify as many recoverable stranded costs as 
possible to protect investors. Regulators are less inclined to do so to protect 
consumers. Assuming that assets can be properly attributed, then a 
valuation must be assessed and valuation methodology, as is apparent from 
trying to evaluate the rate base, is not scientifically precise. The reality is 
that, while there is a consensus on compensating firms for stranded costs, 
there is no consensus on which costs should be recovered or which 
valuation methodology should be used. These choices are fundamentally 
political rather than ecoriomic. 
Again assuming that an amount of stranded costs can be established, 
the question remains: who pays? Should exiting customers pay through an 
exit fee? Should current customers pay through a surcharge? Should 
bondholders pay through securitization? Should shareholders absorb some 
losses? Legislatures and regulators have and will continue to assess each 
strategy. 
The resolution of the stranded costs issue implicates a second problem 
brought about by increased competition. As regulated firms are invited (or 
forced) to compete, they will be competing with new entrants. New entrants 
exist because entry costs are low enough to enter a market, and they believe 
they can price their product below the price of the incumbent. In other 
190 Hovenkamp, supra note 59, at 808 n.26; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 
299, 315 (1989) (holding that a state law prohibiting electric utilities from including facility 
construction costs in its rate base was not a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment); Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1436, 1465 (2000) 
("United States takings jurisprudence has not found that regulatory actions in infrastructure 
industries demand compensation."); Tomain, supra note 78, at 82-87; See Generally Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess 
Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984) (examining the regulatory and market structures 
surrounding stranded cost recovery for abandoned plant projects). 
191 Joseph P. Tomain, networkindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. KANs. L. REV. 829, 850-51 (2000). 
192 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Regulatory Changes by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneafielectricity/ch!LstribookletJferc.html (last 
modified Feb. 21, 2002). 
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words, new entrants believe they have a competitive advantage and 
incumbents believe they have a competitive disadvantage because of 
regulatory burdens. The transition to a more competitive environment must 
at least attempt to level the playing field for incumbents and new entrants 
alike. Competition requires multiple producers, but incumbent producers 
should not be disadvantaged. 193 
The third large issue involves moving competition from the wholesale 
to the retail levels, and this move entails opening access so that consumer 
choice for electricity is maximized. The difficulty here is that private 
transportation network owners are not anxious to give up their competitive 
(monopolistic) advantage, and government is not likely to nationalize. 194 The 
trick is to design a form of transportation that opens access, compensates 
owners fairly, and does not allow operators to discriminate among 
providers, especially between affiliated and non-affiliated providers. This 
will only be solved once the two political problems of federalism and 
corporate form are adequately addressed. 
Because tranSmission is not yet open and competitive, the fourth 
challenge presents itself-congestiori. As competition increases, so does 
demand for transmission. Likewise, as new generation capacity comes on-
line, more transmission is required. Transmission lines must keep pace with . 
the increased demand and the increase in generation. While those 
propositions are easy to understand, the politics of land use and facility 
siting as well as attracting investors all pose hurdles to expansion. It may 
very well be the case that federal, rather than state, oversight is necessary. 195 
The largest question, of course, remains the unsettled design of RTOs and 
the lingering issues of further economic regulation, including price setting 
for transmission service. Prices must be set with some form of incentive 
rate196 so that investment can be made in transmission companies. 
Finally, the regulatory apparatus needed to monitor and manage the 
restructured electricity market and to measure its competitiveness to guard 
against concentrations of market power is formidable. Staffs will monitor 
access to and operation of the transmission networks, monitor various 
markets for signs of competition or concentration, and will monitor markets 
for service quality, price, and reliability. More ambitiously, staff may also 
monitor futures markets and auctions as an adjunct of service issues. 
Regulatory staffs could well grow larger with an attendant increase in costs. 
193 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities, 525 U.s. 366, 388 (1999) (invalidating an FCC regulation 
which required incumbents to provide requesting carriers access to at least seven network 
elements); Anne S. Babineau et al., The Baby and the Bathwater: What the Supreme Court 
Thinks About Handicapping the Incumbent to Level the Field for New Players, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Nov. 15, 1999, at 48 (predicting that the Supreme Court's ruling would cause regulators to 
reconsider any conditions imposed on incumbents). 
194 Nicholas Econornides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact, at 
http://papers.ssm.com/soI3IDisplayAbstractSearch.cfm (last visited Mar. 42002). 
195 Gale & O'Driscoll, supra note 69, at 15-21. 
196 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power 
Sector, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT? 113, 175-86 (Sanl Peltzman & 
Clifford Winston, eds., 2000). 
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They will also require more sophisticated economic expertise so much so 
that deregulation, or more accurately, restructuring may bring about full 
employment for economists (too bad for us lawyerS). The curious paradox 
of a market-based regulatory reform is that we may end up with more rather 
than less regulation. 
The lesson to be drawn from the foregoing is tp.at the electric industry 
remains dynamic and in transition. The mistaken experiment in California 
and the gaffs of Enron notwithstanding, electricity restructuring is good 
policy and is one to which we should be committed for our energy future. 
While it is not likely that we will reach the FERC staffs goal of competitive 
markets by 2011, there is no reason not to aim high. The National Electricity 
Reliability Act or some version thereof looks promising because it will be 
the mechanism to nationalize transmission and operation standards for 
RTOs. FERC's effort to establish four, five, or six RTOs is sound. 197 As long 
as all operate under the same organization standards, electricity should flow 
smoothly, and competitive markets should not be much further in the future. 
197 AM. BAR AsS'N, SECTION OF PUB. UTIL., COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION LAw, 
REPORT OF THE ELECTRICITY COMMITI'EE 27-34 (Fall, 2001); N. AM. ELEc. RELlABIUTY COUNCIL, 
RELlABIUTY AsSESSMENT 2001-2010: THE REUABIUTY OF BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS IN NORTH 
AMERICA 22-23 (Oct. 16,2001). 
